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Abstract
Neural networks are known to be vulnerable to
adversarial examples. In this note, we evaluate the
two white-box defenses that appeared at CVPR
2018 and find they are ineffective: when applying
existing techniques, we can reduce the accuracy
of the defended models to 0%.
1. Introduction
Training neural networks so they will be robust to adver-
sarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013) is a major challenge.
Two defenses that appear at CVPR 2018 attempt to address
this problem: “Deflecting Adversarial Attacks with Pixel
Deflection” (Prakash et al., 2018) and “Defense against Ad-
versarial Attacks Using High-Level Representation Guided
Denoiser” (Liao et al., 2018).
In this note, we show these two defenses are not effective
in the white-box threat model. We construct adversarial
examples that reduce the classifier accuracy to 0% on the
ImageNet dataset (Deng et al., 2009) when bounded by
a small `∞ perturbation of 4/255, a stricter bound than
considered in the original papers. Our attacks can construct
targeted adversarial examples with over 97% success.
Our methods are a direct application of existing techniques.
2. Background
We assume familiarity with neural networks, adversarial
examples (Szegedy et al., 2013), generating strong attacks
against adversarial examples (Madry et al., 2018), and com-
puting adversarial examples for neural networks with non-
differentiable layers (Athalye et al., 2018). We briefly re-
view the key details and notation.
Adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013) are instances
x′ that are very close to an instance x with respect to some
distance metric (`∞ distance, in this paper), but where the
classification of x′ is not the same as the classification of x.
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Figure 1. Original images from ImageNet validation set (row 1).
Targeted adversarial examples (with randomly chosen targets) for
Pixel Deflection (row 2) and High-level representation Guided
Denoiser (row 3), with a `∞ perturbation of  = 4/255.
Targeted adversarial examples are instances x′ whose label
is equal to a given target label t.
We examine two defenses: Pixel Deflection and High-level
Representation Guided Denoiser. We are grateful to the
authors of these defenses for releasing their source code and
pre-trained models.
Pixel Deflection (Prakash et al., 2018) proposes a non-
differentiable preprocessing of inputs. Some pixels (a tun-
able hyperparameter) are randomly replaced with near-by
pixels. This resulting image is often noisy, and to restore
accuracy, a denoising operation is applied.
High-level representation Guided Denoiser (HGR) (Liao
et al., 2018) proposes denoising inputs using a trained neural
network before passing them to a standard classifier. This
denoiser is a differentiable, non-randomized neural network.
This defense has also been evaluated by Uesato et al. (2018)
and found to be ineffective.
2.1. Methods
We evaluate these defenses under the white-box threat
model. We generate adversarial examples with Projected
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Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018) maximizing
the cross-entropy loss and bounding `∞ distortion by 4/255.
What is the right threat model to evaluate against?
Many papers only claim white-box security against an at-
tacker who is completely unaware the defense is being ap-
plied. HGD, for example, says “the white-box attacks de-
fined in this paper should be called oblivious attacks accord-
ing to Carlini and Wagner’s definition” (Liao et al., 2018).
Unfortunately, security against oblivious attacks is not use-
ful. We only defined this threat model in our prior work
(Carlini & Wagner, 2017) to study the case of an extremely
weak attacker, to show that some defenses are not even
robust under this model. Furthermore, many previously pub-
lished schemes already achieve security against oblivious
attacks. In practice, any serious attacker would certainly
consider the possibility that a defense is in place and try to
circumvent it, if there is a reasonable way to do so.
Thus, security against oblivious attacks is far from sufficient
to be interesting or useful in practice. Even the black-box
threat model allows for an attacker to be aware that the
defense is being applied, and only holds the exact param-
eters of the defense as private data. Also, our experience
is that schemes that are insecure against white-box attacks
also tend to be insecure against black-box attacks (Carlini
& Wagner, 2017). Accordingly, in this note, we evaluate
schemes against white-box attacks.
3. Methodology
3.1. Pixel Deflection
We now show that Pixel Deflection is not robust. We analyze
the defense as implemented by the authors 1. Our evaluation
code is publicly available 2.
We apply BPDA (Athalye et al., 2018) to Pixel Deflection
for its non-differentiable replacement operation. Our attack
reduces the accuracy of the defended classifier to 0%.
In a targeted setting, we succeed with 97% probability. (Be-
cause the defense is randomized, we report success only if
the image is classified as the adversarial target label 9 times
out of 10.)
3.2. High-Level Representation Guided Denoiser
Next, we show that using a High-level representation Guided
Denoiser is not robust in the white-box threat model. We
analyze the defense as implemented by the authors 3. Our
evaluation code is publicly available 4.
1
https://github.com/iamaaditya/pixel-deflection
2
https://github.com/carlini/pixel-deflection
3
https://github.com/lfz/Guided-Denoise
4
https://github.com/anishathalye/Guided-Denoise
We apply PGD (Madry et al., 2018) end-to-end with no mod-
ification. It reduces the accuracy of the defended classifier
to 0% and achieves 100% success at generating targeted
adversarial examples.
4. Conclusion
As this note demonstrates, Pixel Deflection and High-level
representation Guided Denoiser (HGD) are not robust to
adversarial examples.
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